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The paper is a further link to many years of 
researching dye response in the near infrared 
part of the spectrum. The theory on different 
color response for the part of the spectrum 
that is visible to the eye, and that of the near 
infrared area was developed in 2009 under 
the name CMYKIR separation (V. Žiljak et al, 
2009). From that moment to date the theory 
has been further developed and continuous ap-
plication is being found in various graphic in-
dustry fields (V. Žiljak et al, 2011; I. Žiljak et al, 
2009; Friščić et al, 2015). Research in the field 
of Infraredesign is divided into several phases. 
One phase is preparing the coloring agent for 
specific printing conditions (V. Žiljak et al, 
2012), and another phase is making the design 
that contains double information. This paper 
is focused on design issues and planning of se-
curity graphics. New algorithms are developed 
that have the goal to accelerate the process of 
security element generating on one hand, and 
by applying stochastics - to lessen the influ-
ence of the human factor during the very pro-
cess of designing, on the other hand (Koren et 
al, 2008). It is also shown in the paper how to 
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Abstract
The paper elaborates on linear graphics and typographic elements in the function of hiding informa-
tion in security printing. Hidden information is introduced with the goal to protect the originality of 
the produced graphic designs so their counterfeiting would be impossible. Those graphic designs are 
made with programmed linear and typographical elements that have different response in the part of 
the spectrum visible to the human eye, and in the near infrared part of the spectrum observed with 
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program security elements to be hidden to the 
human eye, and visible with the help of instru-
ments. Steganography in security printing is 
achieved by controlled application of the black 
component with CMYKIR separation in posi-
tions set with the help of algorithms. The re-
lation between typography and linear graphics 
is researched as a supplement to former works 
(Koren et al, 2010; Koren Ivančević et al, 2015). 
Typographical elements and linear graphics of 
very fine liniature have been used, as well as ro-
settes derived from them. Such linear graphics 
are difficult to counterfeit from the start because 
they contain several security features (Pap et al, 
2014). Very thin lines in securities have a fine 
linear structure possible to produce only with 
very high quality printing techniques. They are 
programmed with Bezier’s curve in such a way 
that besides repetition, they have variable ele-
ments such as altering tension points or various 
transformations. With CMYKIR separation it 
was achieved to make one graphic visible to 
the human eye, and the other in the near in-
frared part of the spectrum. A third security 
element was introduced during the process of 
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their programming, - a different picture in the 
visible field and another in the infrared part of 
the spectrum. The fourth security element is 
hidden in pseudo-random numbers. They are 
used when programming line and typography 
positions, but also for color separation. In some 
designs random values are used for all the four 
colors (CMYK), while the values for certain 
components in other designs are precisely set 
through different parameters. When observing 
a graphic design, elements visible in the near 
infrared part of the spectrum are not visible 
or apparent to the human eye, but are merged 
with the overall. There are five solutions shown 
in the paper for securing information in infra-
red printing.
2  Experimental part
Experiments in security design are elaborated 
in programming language Postscript, combin-
ing typography and Bezier’s curves. Each one of 
the letter character parameters and vector ele-
ments, such as position, color and size are avail-
able for mathematical manipulation. Stochas-
tic parameter alteration is applied in graphics 
planning for the visible part of the spectrum, 
while planning for the graphics in infrared part 
of the spectrum remains in strictly set values. 
Font Minion Pro Medium is used in all given 
examples.
2.1  Letter character mask filled with 
random characters
In the first experiment the letter “a” is filled 
with randomly generated letter characters. Be-
sides having an irregular rhythm of appearing, 
letter characters are programmed in such a way 
that the values for the C, M, and Y channels are 
pseudo-random numbers. They are controlled 
by a seed parameter obtained with the congru-
ential method of generating random numbers. 
By observing the thus filled letter “a” with the 
naked eye, it is not possible to spot any mean-
ingful message or word in the shown multitude 
of letter characters (Figure 1). By observing the 
C, M, and Y channels, it is also apparent that 
the letter characters have random response in 
one of the channels, i.e. in several channels, de-
pending on the random value that the certain 
channel had acquired in the repeating process 
(Figure 2).
Figure 1. Letter character “a” mask filled with random 
letter characters, visible to the human eye at the left 
and the picture visible in the NIR part of the spectrum 
at the right
The letter characters shown in channel K are 
programmed separately from the CMY chan-
nels, so that only they would be visible with the 
help of instruments in the near infrared part of 
the spectrum (NIR) (Figure 1 right).
Figure 2. Letter character “a” mask through C, M, and Y 
channels, from left to right
Figure 3 shows what would happen should 
anyone try to reproduce a design secured in the 
described way. By scanning the picture from 
the paper, it is translated into the RGB color 
system. By converting the picture back to the 
CMYK system, there is different channel sep-
aration and there is no trace of any coherent 
message.
Figure 3. Wrong separation by switching from RGB to 
CMYK system
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2.2.  Rosette formed linear graphic as a 
security element
This example shows two letter characters filled 
with the same very thin line graphic in rosette 
form (Figures 4 and 5). In both of the exam-
ples the C, M, and Y channel values are ran-
dom, but there is a different algorithm in the 
K channel separation. The black channel K is a 
variable with an initial value of 0 in the first ex-
ample (Figure 4), and it is gradually increased 
with each line repetition until it reaches the 
maximum coverage value of 100%. The NIR re-
sponse simulation is shown in Figure 4 on the 
right. Figure 5 shows a version of the same ro-
sette where black (K) is separated as C, M, and 
Y, i.e. with random choice between the mini-
mum (0%) and maximum coverage value (100 
%). The two pictures observed in daylight or 
through the separation of C, M, and Y channels 
do not show any visible or apparent differences, 
whereas there is a completely different distri-
bution visible in channel K (Figure 4 right and 
5 right).
Figure 4. Letter mask on rosette with C, M, and Y 
random coverage values, with gradient rise in K 
coverage values. Left: CMYK, right: black channel 
response simulation in the NIR part of the spectrum
Figure 5. Letter mask on rosette with C, M, Y, and K 
random coverage values. Left CMYK, right: response 
simulation of the black channel in the NIR part of the 
spectrum
2.3  The letter charater and its outline 
filled with text
In this example the letter character and its out-
line are filled with a repeating text (Figure 6). 
For easier understanding the first example has 
a stroked thick outline so that there would be 
a clearly noticeable difference in the separation 
of the CMYK and CMYKIR (Figure 6 left).The 
text “Acta Graphica” fills the mask of the letter 
character as well as that of the outline spreading 
itself along an imagined spiral and diminishing 
in size with each repetition. Even though it is not 
observed with the naked eye, the text filling the 
letter character “mask” is separated differently 
in comparison to the text that fills the outline of 
that mask. In both cases pseudo-random num-
bers were used in color parameters with stochas-
tic altering in each letter sign of the written text. 
Stochastic choice of coverage values was used in 
C, M, and Y channel separation in the complete 
mask area, while the black component was sepa-
rated differently within the outline and the mask 
filling. In the filling of  the character the K com-
ponent is completely eliminated in the separa-
tion, and its value is always 0%. The value is con-
stant in the letter character outline and amounts 
to 50% of the full tone. When observing the K 
channel, only the text in the letter character out-
line is seen clearly, while there is no response of 
the filling in the infrared part of the spectrum 
(Figure 6 right). 
Figure 6. Letter character mask in the visible part of 
the spectrum with different black separation in the 
outline and filling (left and middle), and response 
simulation in the NIR part of the spectrum (right)
2.4  The letter character filled with linear 
graphics and altering color 
In this example there is also experimenting 
with different CMYKIR separation settings for 
the outline and the filling of the letter charac-
ter. Both the letter and its outline are filled with 
concentric circles of very fine liniature. The 
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concentric circles are differently colored going 
from the center to the periphery along the x 
axis, and differently along the y axis, where col-
or changes from magenta into yellow upwards 
and from magenta to cyan going downwards 
(Figure 7 left). The algorithm allows color pa-
rameter manipulation in all directions as gra-
dation, and shown in the enclosed example, or 
stochastically. Figure 7 right shows separation 
of the black channel that will be seen in NIR 
(the letter character outline and part of the let-
ter character mask concentric circles). Figure 
8 displays separation of the remaining three 
channels (CMY) after adjusting the parameters 
for the desired colors in the visible part of the 
spectrum. Figure 9 shows the possible algo-
rithm modifications from the previous example 
where only a part of the circles are seen in the 
infrared part, while the mask is fully hidden. In 
this way only the upper letter character mask 
filled with thin concentric circles is shown.
Figure 7. Letter character filled with concentric circles 
with changing colors, left: CMYK, right: simulation of 
response in NIR
Figure 8. Separation of C, M, and Y channels from the 
example in Figure 7
Figure 9. Letter character filled with concentric circles, 
with change of color. Left: CMYK, right: simulation of 
response in NIR
2.5  The rosette text mask
The text “acta graphica” is set as a mask of a 
very complex rosette that has three different-
ly programmed parts, consisting of Bezier’s 
curves with repetition and parameter alter-
ing, i.e. altering of tension points (Figure 10). 
In this way each letter character of “acta” and 
“graphica” seems to be filled with different 
curves or graphics. In two examples (Figure 10 
and Figure 12) black channel is separated dif-
ferently in order to demonstrate entirely differ-
ent solutions obtained by parameter change in 
the channel separation algorithms.
Figure 10. Text mask on rosette CMYK
Figure 11. Response simulation Figure 10 in NIR
Acta Graphica Vol 27, No 1 (2016) ; 33-38   37
Original scientific paper Koren T. et al.
Steganography of vector graphics and typography in infrared security printing
Figure 12. Text mask on rosette with eliminated K 
component CMYK
Figure 13. Response simulation Figure 12 in NIR
Pseudo-random numbers were used in the first 
example (Figure 10) for all the four colors, re-
sulting in the NIR as random line reproduction 
(Figure 11). In the second example (Figure 
12), the K component is completely eliminated 
from color separation in the rosette, resulting 
as only a thin outline around the text (Figure 
13).
3.  Conclusion
The solutions shown in the paper have multiple 
application possibilities in protecting securities 
or other graphic elements prone to counterfeit-
ing. It is not possible to derive such solutions 
without knowing the CMYKIR theory. The tar-
geted different separation for the visible part 
and the infrared part of the spectrum disap-
pears by scanning, i.e. changing into the RGB 
color system. Pseudo-random numbers used 
for color separation make them unique and un-
repeatable. The use of printing elements with 
programmed text messages visible only in the 
infrared part of the spectrum opens the possi-
bility of application on any graphic product be-
cause it is possible to adapt the letter character 
combination to the purpose of the product that 
needs to be secured. This experiment shows 
that there is possibility of development in the 
field of infrared area security graphics and cre-
ative design of graphic solutions with the help 
of complex algorithms.
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